DYNAMIC CONTRACTING UNDER IMPERFECT INFORMATION

I. NYKYFORCHYN

Abstract


We develop and analyse a discrete dynamic principal-agent model under assumptions of imperfect information. Conditions for optimal contracts in each moment of time are found.


References


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Прикарпатський національний університет імені Василя Стефаника